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Preface
Crimes and catastrophes make eye-catching headlines. Stories that in
clude large sums of money, intrigue, technology, and clever schemes
are good copy. Frauds involving electronic data processing (EDP) often
have all these features. Cases such as the $200 million insurance fraud at
Equity Funding, the $21 million theft at Wells Fargo Bank, the $24 mil
lion misstatement of revenue at JWT Group, Inc., and the $10 million
wire transfer theft from Security Pacific National Bank all received na
tional attention.
These cases share some common characteristics. The perpetrators
were individuals familiar with the companies’ systems; their objectives
were to either carry out or conceal financial misdeeds; and they took ad
vantage of the existing technology.
There has also been press coverage o f break-ins to computer systems
for reasons other than to commit fraud or theft. Although these acts
point out potential security problems, they are not related to the business
fraud cases reviewed in this study.
The purpose of this report is to place the problem of EDP-related
fraud in perspective. Because of the inadequate data available on many
reported cases, it is difficult to determine what went wrong or how the
crime could have been prevented. By describing the specifics of how
several cases were perpetrated, the Task Force hopes to provide infor
mation that will help EDP users prevent becoming victims of similar
frauds.
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Introduction
Background
Growth in the use of large integrated data bases, microcomputers, port
able “intelligent” terminals with access through telecommunications,
and other evolving technologies, can provide greater susceptibility to
fraud. The increasing complexity of computer systems and their related
operations compound the difficulties of preventing and detecting fraud.
The concentration of processing and recording activities in computer
systems makes the accounting records of some organizations more ac
cessible and the manipulation of those records and the concealment of
theft somewhat easier. The decreasing use of hard copy books, records,
and other documents and decreasing human involvement also facilitates
concealment. The ability to alter data in computer systems, often with
out any observable evidence of manipulation, has made it easier to per
petrate and cover up fraud.
Because of the significant potential for EDP-related fraud, the Ameri
can Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA), in 1978, ap
pointed the EDP Fraud Review Task Force to look into the nature and
pervasiveness of such fraud. The Task Force evaluated several sources
of information and reviewed several cases in depth. The Task Force was
unable to obtain significant information from existing or potentially
available sources. This was primarily due to a lack of consistent, com
prehensive, reliable data and a reluctance or inability of the sources to
disclose significant facts.
To obtain information for analysis, a study consisting of two industry
surveys was undertaken, focusing attention on the variety of fraud sce
narios to provide a basis for evaluating the range of conditions through
which EDP-related frauds may occur. The focus of this study was on the
who, what, where, when, why, and how of specific EDP-related fraud
cases rather than on projections of the number of cases or the dollar size
of those cases. For this reason, readers are cautioned not to generalize or
1

draw conclusions on the incidence or dollar magnitude of EDP-related
frauds based on the results of this study.
The extent of EDP-related fraud may not be quantifiable for a variety
of reasons. There is a lack of reliable data. Available data is frequently
based on news coverage. Legal constraints prevent comprehensive anal
ysis of some cases until court proceedings are complete. Not all reports
of fraud accurately distinguish frauds related to EDP, and, in fact, there
is no general agreement on the definition of EDP-related fraud. There is
also a general reluctance of many companies to disclose information
about fraud.
Furthermore, determining the size of the problem may be affected by
the following factors. First, several cases of EDP-related fraud continue
for long periods of time — some for many years — before they are de
tected. Some may never be detected; thus, undetected frauds are likely
to exist, but their number and magnitude are unknown. Second, many
EDP-related frauds are discovered accidentally. Thus, the dollar amount
of reported frauds merely states the minimum amount; the potential total
loss is considerably higher. Third, the amount of the loss may be stated
either before or after restitution, or it may be the amount manipulated or
only the actual amount extracted.

Auditors’ Concern with EDP-Related Fraud
Traditionally, independent auditors have been engaged to lend credibil
ity to the financial statements they examine. Users of those audited fi
nancial statements expect that they can reasonably rely on such state
ments for making economic decisions. Therefore, auditors are
concerned about matters that can materially affect the reliability of the
financial statements under examination.
Fraud or irregularities could have a material effect on the financial
statements. The AICPA’s position on auditors’ responsibilities for the
detection of fraud is stated in Statement on Auditing Standards No. 16:1
Under generally accepted auditing standards the independent auditor has
the responsibility, within the inherent limitations of the auditing process
. . ., to plan his examination . . . to search for errors or irregularities that
would have a material effect on the financial statements, and to exercise
due skill and care in the conduct of that examination . . . . An indepen
1AICPA, Statement on Auditing Standards No. 16, The Independent Auditor’s Re
sponsibility for the Detection of Errors or Irregularities (New York: AICPA, 1977),
paragraph 5.
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dent auditor’s standard report implicitly indicates his belief that the finan
cial statements taken as a whole are not materially misstated as a result of
errors or irregularities.*2(emphasis added)

Because information used in the preparation of financial statements is
often processed by computers, auditors are concerned with errors and
irregularities that might occur during computer processing that could
have a material effect on the financial statements.

Definition of EDP-Related Fraud
The Task Force’s definition of EDP-related fraud used for this study was
“any intentional act, or series of acts, that is designed to deceive or
mislead others and that has an impact or potential impact on an organiza
tion’s financial statements. EDP must be involved in the perpetration or
cover-up of the act or series of acts.” This definition has three essential
characteristics.
1. The existence o f fraud. A good definition of fraud is that given in the
report of the Commission on Auditors’ Responsibilities:3
Viewed broadly, any intentional act designed to deceive or mislead others
is fraud. Fraud in the business environment with which the auditor is
concerned has a more specialized meaning. Fraud may occur at the
employee or management level. Frauds by nonmanagement employees
are generally designed to convert cash or other assets to an employee’s
own benefit. . . . Fraud at the management level includes intentional
misrepresentations that may lead to improper selection of accounting
principles or inclusion of false amounts in, or the omission of amounts
from, financial statements. It is usually accompanied by acts of conceal
ment, such as omission of entries, manipulation of documents (including
forgery), or collusion among individuals inside or outside the company.

2. An impact on the financial statements. Fraud can affect financial
statements in a variety of ways:
• Theft, impairment, or misrepresentation of assets
• Misrepresentation, omission, or concealment of liabilities or
equities
• Manipulation or misrepresentation of revenue or expenses
2Irregularities are defined by SAS No. 16 as intentional distortions of financial state
ments or misappropriations o f assets.

3Commission on Auditors’ Responsibilities: Report, Conclusions, and Recommenda
tions (New York: AICPA, 1978), page 32.
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3. Involvement o f EDP. The third and essential characteristic of the
definition of EDP-related fraud used for the study is that EDP must
be directly involved in the perpetration or cover-up of the scheme.
EDP may be directly involved by any improper manipulation of:

Input or transaction data — Manipulations may occur when unau
thorized data are prepared for input to a computer system or when
authorized input is improperly altered, duplicated, destroyed, or
withheld.
Output or results — Manipulations may happen when reports, files,
or other output are mislabeled, misrepresented, altered, or misdeliv
ered to effect a fraud or cover-up.
Application programs — Manipulations may be accomplished by
the development of unauthorized programs, or segments of pro
grams, or by the subsequent alteration of once-acceptable programs
or documentation.
Data files — Manipulations may happen when files are directly
changed without transactions, such as through the use of file utilities
or on-line terminal access.
Computer operations — Manipulations may result from the deliber
ate misuse of the computer system operations such as the use of the
wrong programs, data files or transactions, or the interruption of
normal program processing.
Communications — Manipulations may happen by intervention in
the process of data being sent between terminals and the computer or
between two or more computers.
Computer hardware, systems software or firmware — Manipula
tions may happen by improper use, alteration, or intervention in the
functioning of these resources.
Other definitions of EDP-related fraud have included theft of software,
hardware, or data; theft of computer time; and errors (made without the
intent to deceive). The definition used for this study specifically ex
cluded those occurrences, as well as other computer crimes or abuses,
such as the destruction of computer software or hardware or illegal
access to telecommunications or computer systems without the intent to
commit fraud.
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The Study
To study EDP-related fraud, surveys were conducted in the banking and
insurance industries in cooperation with the Bank Administration Insti
tute, the American Insurance Association, the American Council of Life
Insurance, and the Life Office Management Association. These indus
tries were selected because both are highly automated, both deal in
liquid assets, and the operations of entities within each industry are
fairly similar.
Similar questionnaires were sent to banks and insurance companies.
No respondent identification techniques were used, although respon
dents were invited to identify themselves to permit follow-up inquiry. In
some cases, the Task Force contacted banks and insurance companies
that had identified themselves, to obtain additional information to
complete the analysis.
It should be noted that survey participation was voluntary. The Task
Force was aware of some significant cases that were not reported
through the surveys and could, therefore, not be included in the study.
Of the 9,405 banks surveyed, 5,127 responded, yielding a response
rate of 55 percent. Of those responding, 105 reported they had experi
enced at least one case of what was believed to be EDP-related fraud and
submitted information on one of their cases. After reviewing the details
of all reported cases, it was determined that 85 conformed to the study
definition.
The insurance company questionnaire was sent to 1,232 companies,
429 were casualty-property insurance companies, and 803 were life and
health insurance companies. A total of 854 responded, for a response
rate of 69 percent. The respondents identified 40 cases they believed to
be EDP-related fraud. Of the cases submitted, 34 conformed to the
study definition.
The data and analyses provided in the following sections, although
presented in some cases in a numerical format, are not intended to
present conclusions about the incidence or magnitude but rather on the
general nature and means of committing some EDP-related frauds.
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Summary of Findings
The 119 cases identified in the surveys of EDP-related fraud in the
banking and insurance industries provide useful information for devis
ing strategies for preventing and detecting EDP-related fraud. The
results of the surveys are categorized to answer the following questions:
•
•
•
•

What was the environment in which the frauds were committed?
What was the general nature of the frauds, and how were they
committed?
Who committed the frauds, why, and what corrective action was
taken?
How were the frauds detected?

What Was the Environment in Which the
Frauds Were Committed?
In almost all cases, the fraud occurred during normal transaction proc
essing cycles. The type of computer system was not significant. Also,
fraud occurred in both batch and on-line systems. It should be noted,
however, that at the time of the surveys the insurance industry used on
line systems more than the banking industry did. This accounts for some
industry differences in the analyses. Many types of application systems
were subject to manipulation.

What Was the General Nature of the Frauds,
and How Were They Committed?
Perpetrators employed a variety of schemes, methods, and techniques.
Relatively few perpetrators used sophisticated techniques; many took
advantage of weaknesses in the system o f internal accounting control.
Inadequate segregation of duties was a common weakness in the re
ported frauds.
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Most frauds were perpetrated in the input area; perpetrators generally
introduced or created unauthorized input or manipulated otherwise
proper input. File maintenance was a fairly common method used by
perpetrators; in all but one of these cases, the file maintenance manipu
lation involved nonfinancial data (for example, extending due dates on
loans, changing names and addresses).
A specific area worthy of mention is the importance of control over
access codes and passwords and, specifically in banking, the availabil
ity of personal identification numbers and the plastic cards needed to
access automated teller machines.
In some cases, there appears to have been no significant attempt at
concealment. It appears that the perpetrator may have relied on a large
volume of transactions to cause the fraudulent transaction to be “lost.”
In other cases, perpetrators attempted to conceal their frauds by altering
names and addresses to divert normal customer correspondence. Sev
eral cases involved over 100 transactions, but in one case, several
million dollars was taken in a single transaction.
Losses from the reported cases ranged up to several million dollars,
although the majority involved amounts of $25,000 or less. The amount
of the loss is before any restitution.

Who Committed the Frauds, Why, and What
Corrective Action Was Taken?
The cases showed the range of perpetrators covered almost every aspect
of corporate operations, with the preponderance outside the EDP area.
Most perpetrators in the banking industry were either data entry clerks
or loan officers. In the insurance industry, most were claim processors
or policy service clerks. Where perpetrators were supervisors or man
agement personnel, their schemes generally lasted longer and involved
larger dollar amounts.
In several cases, accomplices were used to receive or negotiate funds;
but, in virtually all of these cases, they were not necessary to perpetrate
the fraud.
The primary objective of most perpetrators was to take money from
the bank or insurance company; however, some perpetrators manipu
lated data to show a better record of performance (for example, one
bank loan officer extended due dates on loans to show a good record of
loan collections).
In virtually all cases, perpetrators were employees and were later
dismissed from employment. In the majority of the cases, legal action

7

was taken or was pending. In many cases, restitution was made or was in
process.

How Were the Frauds Detected?
According to the respondents, the cases were detected by the following
means:
1. Methods of detection:
• In approximately one-third of the cases, the systems of internal
accounting control or routine internal or external audits uncovered
the fraud.
• Approximately another one-third of the cases were detected
through nonroutine events (such as, accident, unusual activity of
perpetrator, or tip-off).
2. Sources of detection:
• In the majority of the cases, people uncovering the frauds were
within the company (that is, other employees, middle manage
ment, and internal auditors).
• In about one-fourth of the cases, customer complaints were
mostly the source within the first three months. Virtually all these
cases occurred in the banking industry; in the insurance industry,
policyholders usually were not aware that fraudulent transactions
had been processed against their policies.
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Analysis of Reported Cases
Selected characteristics of each EDP-related fraud and perpetrator were
identified and summarized to present a composite profile of the 119
cases reported by the survey respondents (85 bank cases and 34 insur
ance cases). This section contains tables and explanations o f these
analyses.

Application Systems Affected
The application system is the primary area of operations affected by the
fraud. Listed below, by industry, are the applications reported affected
by the 119 cases, from most to least frequently affected.
Table 1 — Application System

Banking
• Demand Deposits
• Proof and Transit

• Installment Loans
• Credit Card Loans

• Savings Accounts
• Commercial Loans
• Automated Teller Machines
• Check Credit

• Cash Control

Insurance
• Accident and Health Claims
• Property and Casualty Premiums
• Life Insurance
Premiums/Commissions
• Policy Loans
• Property and Casualty Claims
• Life Insurance Dividends,
Surrenders (Cancellations),
and Other Transactions

• Mortgage Loans
• Wire Transfer
Banking Applications

Demand deposits are checking accounts.
Proof and transit is the verification and balancing of daily bank trans9

actions, accounting distribution of those transactions, and collection of
checks and drafts payable at or through other banks.
Installment loans are single disbursement, often consumer, loans that
are repaid through regular payments.
Credit card loans are revolving credit lines available to bank credit
card holders.
Savings accounts refers to relatively low-rate interest-bearing de
posits.
Commercial loans are typically single payment loans.
Automated teller machines (ATM) allow customers to deposit, with
draw, or transfer funds, remotely, without the involvement of a bank
employee. For purposes of analysis, ATM has been categorized as a
special application, distinct from the cash application.
Check credit refers to revolving credit activated by writing checks
and overdrafts.
Cash control is the cash balancing function performed by tellers.
Mortgage loans are generally collateralized long-term loans.
Wire transfers are the instantaneous, electronic movements of, fre
quently, large amounts from accounts at the bank to other banks.
Insurance Applications

Accident and health claims cover recording, approving, and paying
claims for medical expenses under group or individual accident or
health insurance policies.
Property and casualty premiums includes processing of premium
billings, endorsements, refunds, and cancellations.
Life insurance premiums/commissions covers processing of billings
and adjustments, as well as commissions due to agents.
Policy loans refers to loans made against the cash surrender value of
life insurance policies.
Property and casualty claims includes recording, approving, and
paying claims for damages to property, liability for damages to the prop
erty of others, or injuries to others.
Life insurance dividends, surrenders (cancellations), and other trans
actions have been grouped together for purposes of this analysis.

Schemes
Scheme is the fraudulent activity used by the perpetrator to effect the
fraud. The accompanying table lists the schemes reported by industry,
from most to least frequent.

10

Table 2 — Scheme

Banking
Divert customer funds into per
petrator’s own account
Make unauthorized extensions of
credit limits, loan due dates
Create fictitious loans
Defer recording of perpetrator’s
own checks and charges
Forge customer input documents
(checks and withdrawals)
Make ATM extractions
Make adjustments to customer
deposits
Divert loan payments into perpe
trator’s own account
Divert customer income to per
petrator’s own account
Wire transfer

Insurance
Create fictitious claims
Trigger unauthorized refund or
reduction of premiums
Create unauthorized policy loans
Trigger unauthorized dividend
withdrawals
Forge checks
Create unauthorized mortgage
loans
Reinstate lapsed policies
Create fictitious pension
payments

Banking Schemes

In the cases of fraud in the banking industry, misposting or misdirecting
customer deposits, often to the perpetrator’s own account, was most fre
quent. Other frequently used schemes included crediting loans to bor
rowers who never received the funds, or who, in fact, may never have
existed. In several cases, perpetrators made unauthorized extensions of
credit limits and loan due dates. They changed the due dates on their
own loans, or they changed the due date on loans for which they were
responsible to make their job performance look better.
Insurance Schemes

The most frequently used scheme in the insurance industry was generat
ing claim payments to the perpetrator or to accomplices. Another promi
nent scheme was generating refunds or reductions of policy premiums,
for example, by authorizing refund checks after changing policyholder
names and addresses, or by cancelling policies to automatically gener
ate policy refund checks (the checks were forged and the policies were
later reinstated).
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Methods
Method identifies what the perpetrator did to the automated system to
initiate and carry out the fraud. Several perpetrators employed multiple
methods. In these cases, the analysis identified the one method that was
most instrumental in carrying out the fraud. Table 3 lists the methods
used, which were similar in the banking and insurance industries.
Table 3 — Method

Method

Banking

Insurance

Transactions manipulation to:
Create original items
Divert or capture items
Force or divert rejects
Subtotals

16
21
14
51

18
2
20

File maintenance changes:
Nonfinancial fields
Financial fields
Subtotals

23
1
24

13

6

1

Direct file changes
Other
Totals

-

13

_4
85

34

Creation of original items includes initiating transfers from customer
accounts to the perpetrator’s account, making adjustments to their own
accounts, creating loans, submitting fraudulent claims, requesting pol
icy loans, initiating policy dividends or refunds.
Diverting or capturing items includes incorrectly encoding or altering
the encoding of items to be posted to customer deposits, assets, or fee
income. Also, items such as premium receipts or the perpetrator’s own
checks were removed from normal processing.
To force or divert rejects, perpetrators altered magnetic ink character
recognition encoding. For example, a bookkeeper changed the check
digit on deposits thus interfering with their timely processing and
permitting a deposit lapping scheme. Other perpetrators also incorrectly
encoded previously rejected items to misdirect deposits or to capture
items to prevent further processing.
File maintenance changes involved making unauthorized changes to
computer-based master files. This included increasing credit limits,
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changing dates, opening credit or loan accounts, reactivating closed
accounts, changing names and addresses, and reinstating lapsed poli
cies.
Direct file changes involved changing master files without any associ
ated transaction processing or file maintenance, for example, by the
misuse of file utility routines.

Procedures
Procedure describes how the perpetrator manipulated the automated
system to allow the methods to work. Table 4 lists the procedures the
perpetrators followed.
Table 4 — Procedure

Procedure

Banking

Insurance

Prepared forms or documents improperly
Unauthorized on-line transactions, input,
or access
Prepared EDP-media improperly
Altered forms or documents authorized by
someone else
Manipulated EDP-media
Unauthorized program alterations
Manipulated EDP output
Totals

34

18

11
24

15
—

7
5
3
1
85

-

1
34

In both industries, the perpetrators, generally, either introduced
unauthorized transactions or altered or manipulated authorized
transactions.
In nearly half the cases, input forms were prepared improperly, for
example, file maintenance forms or claim data forms. In a number of
other cases, on-line terminals were used to input unauthorized transac
tions, file maintenance entries, or to gain information necessary to
effect the fraud (for example, through inquiry routines). The cases of
improper preparation of EDP-media involved proof operators, key
punch operators, or machine operators, intentionally misposting or
miskeying transactions or misusing suspense accounts, inter-branch
transactions, or adjustments. The absence of cases in this third category
in the insurance industry is a reflection of the significance of on-line
processing.
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Perpetrators
Perpetrator refers to the position of the person mainly responsible for
the fraud. Table 5 lists the reported perpetrator, by industry, in order of
frequency.
Table 5 — Perpetrator

Banking
• Clerks (data entry, proof machine
operators, other)
• Managers (loan officers)
• Data processors (operators,
systems and application
programmers)
• Tellers
• Item processors

Insurance
• Clerks (claim processors, policy
service, other)
• Supervisors (claims, policy
service, other)
• Insurance agents
• Systems programmers

Clerical personnel were the most frequent perpetrators reported in
both industries. They often had many opportunities to perpetrate a fraud
by altering, rejecting, or otherwise incorrectly processing items, as well
as by introducing unauthorized items. In the banking industry, they
generally included data entry clerks and proof machine operators; in the
insurance industry, claim processors and policy service clerks.
In the banking industry, perpetrators reported at the clerical level
were more likely to be involved in frauds in the checking, proof and
transit, and savings areas. In the insurance industry, clerical personnel
usually focused on claims.
The next most prominent category of perpetrator reported was mid
level management or supervisory personnel. In banking, the manage
ment personnel were generally loan officers who initiated fictitious
loans or extended loan due dates. In the insurance industry, manage
ment personnel were generally clerical supervisors using any of the
applications including premiums, claims, and loans.
Computer personnel (systems and applications programmers and
operators) were also moderately prominent in banking, but to a lesser
extent in insurance. Computer personnel tended to focus on diversion of
funds in banking. However in the insurance study, a systems program
mer changed certain parameters concerning his own policy.
The most common objective of the perpetrators in both industries was
theft of assets. To a lesser extent, some perpetrators sought to manipu
late information used by management or even the financial statements,
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in order to present better performance records. Occasionally a fraud was
perpetrated primarily for self-satisfaction.

Fraud Size
The emphasis of these studies focused on the circumstances of the fraud
rather than the dollar magnitude of individual cases. Nevertheless, the
accompanying table shows an interesting relationship between the size
of the fraud and the perpetrator’s position. (The dollar size is the gross
amount manipulated rather than only the amount actually extracted and
is before any restitution.)
Table 6 — Number of Cases by Dollar Range
(thousands)

Perpetrator
Banking cases
Clerical
Managers
Data processors
Tellers
Others

Insurance cases
Clerical
Supervisors
Others

Under$25

$26-$100

More than
$100

Total

37
7
9
5
_5
63

4
2
2
_2
10

1
6
2
1
_2
12

38
17
13
8
_9
85

17
2
1
20

3
2
2
7

1
5

21
9
_4
34

1
7

Management and supervisory level personnel tended to be responsible
for the larger frauds, and clerical level personnel tended to be responsi
ble for the smaller frauds. In one case, a pension supervisor was able
to extract $400,000 because he had complete control over payment
transactions and related correspondence with contract holders and
claimants.

Duration
Duration of the fraud refers to the length of time the fraudulent activity
was occurring.
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Table 7 — Relationship of Duration to Perpetrator

Perpetrator
Banking cases
Clerical
Supervisors/managers
EDP personnel
Others

Insurance cases
Clerical
Supervisors/managers
EDP personnel
Others

Number of Cases Lasting
Less Than 1 to 12
More than
Months
1 Month
12 Months
8
1
5
_1
15

36
6
7
1
50

4

13
3
1

-

4

_2
19

Total

1
1
20

51
19
12
_3
85

4
6

21
9

12
-

-

1
11

1
_3
34

Frauds perpetrated by supervisory or management personnel tended to
last longer than those perpetrated by clerical personnel. In one case, a
claim supervisor was able to extract money over five years because he
had access to subordinates’ passwords, could submit false claims for
clerks to process, and could access terminals to change master file data.

Concealment
In several cases no significant attempt to conceal the fraud was apparent,
such as a one-shot extraction of funds with no effort to cover up. Perpe
trators appear to have been relying on the possibility that fraudulent
transactions would be “overlooked” or “lost” in the larger volume of
transactions normally processed or would simply be written off as un
reconciled items.
When attempts at concealment had been made, the effort usually in
volved using file maintenance transactions or destroying or “mislay
ing” source documents or output documents. Frequently, addresses
used for mailing customer bank statements or policyholder change
notices were changed so that fraudulent transactions would not come to
a customer’s attention. In one case, a policy service clerk used a termi
nal and an error correction routine to reverse the effect of file main
tenance changes submitted earlier to perpetrate the fraud. In another
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case, computer-generated policyholder cancellation notices were
destroyed. In still others, error or reject listings were destroyed or
“mislaid.”

Detection
According to the respondents, the methods and sources of detection of
the fraud were as follows.
Method of Detection

Method o f detection identifies the event or factor that triggered the de
tection of the fraud.
Table 8 — Method of Detection

Method
Control and audit
Internal controls
Routine audit
Customer complaint/inquiry
Unusual or non-routine events
Accident, tip-off, unusual
activity of perpetrator
Non-routine study
Change in operations,
EDP, or financial
statements
Unidentified
Totals

Banking

Insurance

12
17
24

10
4
4

11
8

15
1

7

-

6

~

85

34

Complaints from customers were much more significant to the detection
of the fraud in banking (particularly in the checking and deposit areas)
due to frequent correspondence with customers. For frauds of short du
ration (less than four months), customer complaint/inquiry was the most
significant factor in detecting the frauds. In one case, after a clerk with
drew funds from a customer’s account, the clerk intercepted the cus
tomer’s statements. The customer complained after one statement
slipped through.
Frauds perpetrated with file maintenance changes were usually de
tected through internal accounting controls and audit. Frauds perpe
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trated by manipulating transactions were detected almost equally by
control and audit, customer complaint/inquiry, and accident.
Source of Detection

Source o f detection identifies who first discovered the fraud (or caused
the fraud to be discovered).
Table 9 — Source of Detection

Source

Banking

Insurance

Other employees
Middle management
Internal auditors
Customers
External auditors/examiners
Other/unidentified
Totals

23
20
20
16
4
_2
85

16
7
5
—

_6

34

Other employees, including substitute clerks, accounting clerks, and
mail clerks, among others, made up the single most significant group in
detecting fraud.

The following appendix contains details of selected cases. These
cases were selected to illustrate the wide range of fraud scenarios de
scribed in the surveys.
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APPENDIX

Sampling of Cases From the Study
(a ll am o u n ts a re a p p ro xim ate)
Banking Cases

1. A data entry clerk manipulated the automated central information file
that permitted debit cards to access unrelated customer accounts through
automatic teller machines. Over 100 transactions totaling $25,000 were made
within a period of less than two months. Numerous customer complaints were
received about unauthorized ATM withdrawals against their accounts. These
complaints triggered an investigation that discovered the fraud.
2. A computer operator using a card-driven system prepared a false set of
ledger cards that increased his checking account balance and decreased a large
business checking account balance, which had reached $90,000. Each month at
statement preparation time, accurate statements were prepared for the customer
using the correct ledger cards. After several years, the fraud was detected by an
employee researching another account.
3. A data entry clerk responsible for reviewing all maintenance changes on
installment loans changed the due date on his own loan. He was thereby able to
extend the loan five to ten times and not make any payments. The total amount
of the loan was $3,500. When the employee was transferred, he could no longer
make the extensions. The loan became past due, and the fraud was discovered.
4. Unauthorized extensions of payment due dates were made over a threeyear period to loans of approximately $1 million. The perpetrator, a member of
senior management, thereby hid delinquencies and showed a better lending and
collection record. The extensions were made by master file changes prepared
by the individual, who would then remove the change forms when the work was
returned from the service bureau. Regulatory examiners made an investigation
when they noted there were loans shown as current without payments made or
extension fees charged.
5. A data entry clerk obtained a customer’s credit card and personal
identification number from returned mail. He then raised the credit limit on the
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terminal and obtained cash from an automatic teller machine. Over a five month
period $3,000 was obtained. The customer was not aware of this, as the clerk
intercepted the statements. When one statement did get to the customer, the
customer’s complaint triggered the detection.
6. An applications programmer analyst increased his bank account and
reduced a customer’s account by a file manipulation, the specific mechanism of
which was not disclosed. The fraud was discovered when the customer com
plained. The period of concealment was less than a month and the total amount
was under $1,000.
7. A proof clerk correcting rejected items keyed in a false credit to his own
checking account, using a CRT terminal. The total amount involved was under
$300, and the period of concealment was less than one month. One of the false
credits he entered was not offset by a debit. This caused an out-of-balance
situation that was traced to his account. Subsequent investigation disclosed the
nature and scope of the fraud.
8. A computer operator increased the balance on his own checking account
ledger card and decreased the balances for two other accounts. At statement
time, he would reverse all the changes so the statements sent out would be
correct.
The total amount involved in this fraud was less than $1,000 and it was
concealed for two months. The fraud was detected by the EDP manager when
he came into work early one day and supervised the preparation of statements
before the operator had a chance to replace the improper cards. A system check
that recalculated the statement balance then flagged the accounts as out-of
balance.
9. An officer who supervised operations at a branch withheld savings
deposits from customer savings accounts and took cash or credited his own
account as an offset. The perpetrator occasionally filled in as a teller and would
sell money orders and never record them as outstanding. When a complaint was
made by a customer that a deposit had not been entered, the perpetrator entered
a correction charging another account with the offset. Sometimes he took cash
and offset the shortage by creating an inter-branch clearing. When no response
to such entries were made after five to six days by other branches, the amounts
were transferred to the branch’s suspense account. The perpetrator also con
trolled that account. For the month-end balancing they were charged to another
suspense account and then transferred back after the balancing.
Concealment lasted thirteen months, and the total amount was $800,000.
The EDP system was used in processing the entries and in transferring the
entries from account to account thereby causing them to lose their identity. The
fraud was discovered when the perpetrator was transferred to another branch.
Subsequently, a customer complained about a charge to his savings account that
had not been authorized. The fraudulent item was traced by another employee
who found that an embezzlement had occurred.
10.
The cashier of this bank was able to extend loan due dates to avoid
disclosure of delinquent accounts and to conceal poor lending practices. The
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total amount of the loans involved was $500,000. The fraud took place for a
year. It was discovered by a loan secretary who inquired about the recurring
maintenance changes extending loan due dates. Apparently, no funds were
actually taken.
11. A teller misappropriated cash payments made on loans and then ex
tended the due dates so the loans would not show up as past due. The extensions
were made by preparing file maintenance change sheets. After the maintenance
instructions were acted on, the individual destroyed the sheets. The total
amount involved was $3,000 and the fraud was concealed for six months. The
fraud was discovered by the auditors when they confirmed loan balances with
borrowers.
12. A credit card clerk established fictitious card accounts and credit limits.
The accounts were created, addresses changed, credit lines increased, and
closed accounts reactivated by terminal entry. The cards were used for cash
advances and for purchases. A total of $20,000 was involved; the period of
concealment was two months. Collectors became involved in investigating
some of these accounts for which statements were returned by the post office or
that had exceeded their credit line. Research on undelivered statements re
vealed that the accounts lacked authorization and supporting documentation.
Further investigation identified the perpetrator and the nature of the fraud.
13. A note clerk working with a customer as an accomplice changed that
customer’s overdraft limit via on-line terminal input. The maintenance code to
do this was supposedly known only by senior management. Approvals were
forged on the input document. This customer was then allowed to draw up to
$6,000 against the improperly authorized credit line. The fraud was concealed
for three months. Payments were made by other unauthorized advances that
were not properly shown on the reconciliation of the account. The accomplice
made the mistake of calling the bank several times inquiring about the amount
of his credit limit. This aroused the suspicion of the note supervisor, who
couldn’t understand why a customer would call several times concerning his
credit limit. Upon investigation, it was found that the $6,000 credit limit had
not been properly approved. Further investigation identified the scheme and the
perpetrators.
14. The money transfer department received instructions from an imposter
to transfer $5 million. The imposter identified himself as an employee of a
branch and stated that he had received instructions from a customer to transfer
the money to another institution for further transfer to that institution’s cus
tomer. The test code reported by the imposter for that date and branch were
correct, thereby not causing suspicion. The following morning the customer,
upon receiving notification of the transaction, disputed the item and denied
authorizing it. Upon inquiry, the branch reported that they never issued such
instructions.
15. In this case, a branch manager and a computer operator colluded to
extract cash from an automatic teller machine. The branch manager stole the
money from the machine while the computer operator destroyed logs and

21

records of transactions transmitted from the machine to the computer center.
The money was taken in small amounts over a period of four months. Between
10 and 100 shortages were involved totaling $3,500. An investigation of the
cash shortages revealed the scheme between the branch manager and the
computer operator. The fraud was concealed for four months.
16. An applications programmer using a terminal altered the computer
programs governing the bank’s cash management service. This program auto
matically triggered reports of excess funds, which were then to be transferred
by wire to another bank. Very likely, they were credited to his own account
rather than wired elsewhere. The fraud was discovered within a month because
the fraudulent transfers caused overdrafts to customers’ accounts. When the
overdraft unit investigated disputed transactions, it discovered differences
between the customer’s instructions and the automatic charges. After the
internal audit department investigated, the scheme and the perpetrator were
identified. Between five and ten transactions were involved. The total amount
of the fraud was $600,000, but no money was extracted from the bank. The
period of concealment was less than a month.
17. Fictitious commercial loans were set up by a branch manager by creating
false input documents. New fictitious loans were created eventually to pay off
older fictitious loans. In those cases where a demand loan had been created, he
paid interest to keep the loan current. The perpetrator input file maintenance
changes to ensure that all bank mail pertinent to the fictitious loans would be
routed to post office boxes he controlled.
The fraud was discovered by audit confirmation and by a customer’s com
plaint of irregularities at the branch. The auditors investigated loan confirma
tions returned by borrowers whose addresses were listed as post office boxes.
Checking the signatures on the confirmations, the auditors found them to be
questionable in comparison with the bank’s signature card files. Further com
munication with the people listed as borrowers uncovered the fraud. The total
amount was $120,000. It was concealed for five years, and over 100 transac
tions were involved.
18. The EDP manager made program alterations causing activity on his
account to be suppressed from the detail on overdraft reports although the total
was correct. He also made a change to ensure that no statement would be
prepared for his account. All of the checking programs were changed to avoid
his account. Checks that were paid against his account would be removed from
the files before they were filmed. The account became overdrawn, but it was
never reported as such. Since no statement was ever prepared, no one became
aware of the overdraft in the normal course of operations. In this way, the EDP
manager was able to set up a potentially unlimited overdraft line for himself.
The fraud was detected by running internal audit software independently
against the files. The fraud was concealed for a period of six and one-half years.
The total amount of the overdraft accumulated to $40,000 and involved over
100 items.
19. A data entry clerk used a CRT terminal to set up a fraudulent revolving
credit line for a check/credit account in his name. The credit line was never
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properly authorized. The perpetrator then drew the full amount of the credit line
and deposited this amount to his account. Access to the computer terminal was
not restricted. Computer reports of the new loans set up were not reviewed.
The total amount of the fraud amounted to $6,000. The period of conceal
ment was five months. It was detected when one of his transactions was rejected
due to a systems change (requiring that loan cycle dates and checking statement
cycle dates coincide). Investigation found that his credit line was not
authorized.
20. An applications programmer-analyst used a vendor-supplied utility pro
gram to make two fraudulent transfers from customer savings accounts into his
own. The total fraudulently transferred was $10,000. The perpetrator then
withdrew the entire $10,000 from his account the next day.
At the time of the fraud, the bank was undergoing a major systems conver
sion. During this conversion, programmers were allowed to routinely enter the
computer room to operate and test programs. Since the bank’s savings system
was in a conversion mode, the audit department of the bank had been watching
exception transaction reports very closely. The bank’s daily reporting systems
identified large transactions against savings accounts. On this day, the auditors
noted a large $10,000 withdrawal from an account that reported a previous
day’s balance of only $3. They also noted that no $10,000 deposit transaction
had been recorded simultaneously. This unusual withdrawal, without an offset
ting deposit should have caused an overdraft. Upon investigation, it was deter
mined that the account belonged to an employee of the computer service center.
21. An operations officer in the charge card department would divert cus
tomer payments to his own account by keying in his account number on pay
ment processing documents. The perpetrator’s duties included investigation of
customer complaints. If he received a complaint on one of the defrauded ac
counts, he entered a payment to that account and debited a suspense account.
Suspense debits were lapped to further confuse the trail. After the perpetrator
quit the bank, subsequent customer complaints were investigated and led to dis
covery of the fraud. The fraud was concealed for one year and totalled $3,000.
22. An operations officer increased his own credit line without authority via
computer terminal entry. The bank had a terminal system that allowed account
information inquiries to be made on-line. Later, a system change allowed for
direct terminal update of certain “ nonmonetary” fields that included credit line
limits. The perpetrator was then able to raise the line of credit on his account
and draw the limit. A routine audit test later revealed that this account exceeded
its original credit limit. Subsequent investigation found that his unauthorized
entry via computer terminal had raised the credit limit. The perpetrator later
repaid the loan. The total amount of the line withdrawn was $500, and the
fraudulent loan was in effect four months before being detected.
23. A computer operator, using direct access to the master files through a
computer console, transferred deposit balances from inactive accounts into ac
counts controlled by customers with whom he was in collusion. The EDP man
ager also cooperated in the scheme. The funds were withdrawn from the recipi
ent account by the accomplices. The computer operator hoped to conceal the
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frauds by changing the balances during statement preparation. This was to be
done by raising the forwarded balance. He chose relatively inactive accounts to
further minimize the chance of detection. Finally, he made some unauthorized
transfers to accounts owned by persons uninvolved in the scheme to further
confuse the situation in case an investigation developed. After a month and a
half, however, a customer did complain that his statement balance had been
reduced without any transaction being posted. An investigation revealed that
the “error” was caused by direct console intervention.
24. An applications programmer, who also functioned as an operator, devel
oped a software program to decrease balances in selected inactive accounts and
increase the balance in his own account. No transactions were input, but the
files were directly changed. Cycle codes were also altered to ensure that state
ments would not be mailed until the perpetrator could intercept them. The per
petrator then prepared falsified statements and mailed them to the customers. In
one case, the post office returned a falsified statement to the bank, and the per
petrator then didn’t bother anymore with preparing statements for the customer.
This customer, however, came in and asked for his statement. A subsequent
investigation revealed the fraud and identified the perpetrator. The fraud was
concealed for a period of 13 months and involved between 11 and 100 items.
The total amount misappropriated was $25,000.
Insurance Cases

25. A policy service clerk obtained a management-level password and used
it to submit file maintenance transactions to reverse surrendered policies on the
master file and to update dividend fields. Policies were later surrendered again
and checks made payable to the clerk’s spouse. The clerk also manipulated a
loan on an active policy, which led to detection of the schemes when the policy
holder questioned a loan transaction in response to a confirmation. A follow-up
inquiry revealed the improper transactions in the policy adjustment and dis
bursement areas. The schemes lasted about three months and amounted to
$ 6 , 000.

26. A policy service supervisor held back incoming cash premium receipts
until just prior to the automatic lapsing of policies. “ New cash” would then be
used to cover the premiums due on the about-to-lapse policies. Sometimes the
supervisor used the computer to generate “ new cash” by submitting a file main
tenance transaction to place the supervisor’s name on an active policy that had
premiums paid to a certain date. The supervisor would then take an incoming
check payment on another policy and apply it to the changed policy; a company
check was automatically produced in the supervisor’s name with an explanation
that the policy was overpaid. A tip from an employee initiated an audit that
revealed the scheme. The scheme lasted two years, involved over 100 transac
tions, and netted $30,000.
27. A policy service clerk had the authority to cross functional department
lines to resolve problem cases requiring refunds or return of premiums. The
clerk also had authority to initiate and approve disbursement requests. Using
these authorities, the clerk initiated fraudulent premium refund requests and
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buried the transactions in various suspense accounts. The clerk also submitted
override transactions to block automatic adjustments to commissions because
of the premium refunds. Detection occurred when the operating management
started reviewing old, suspended transactions. The scheme netted $17,000 over
thirty-two months.
28. A policy service clerk normally received a computer printout showing
the cash surrender values of policies that had lapsed for nonpayment of premi
ums. The clerk introduced file maintenance transactions to place certain poli
cies back into an active status on the master policy file (always selecting poli
cies with a policyholder name similar to the perpetrator’s). The clerk then
submitted transactions to produce checks for the policy equity cash value and
deposited the checks in an account. The clerk subsequently came forward and
revealed the fraudulent activity, which lasted for ten months and amounted to
$ 6 , 000.

29. To make loan delinquencies appear to be within the established guide
lines, a mortgage loan manager used a computer terminal and entered file main
tenance transactions to manipulate mortgage loan due dates. Having success
fully accomplished this scheme, the manager then began using the terminal to
establish fraudulent loans. The total financial manipulation exceeded
$320,000, with $55,000 actually converted to cash over a period of nine
months. The schemes were uncovered during a routine annual audit.
30. A senior claim processor with signature authority issued claim checks to
a fictitious payee that were later forged and deposited in a bank account. To
conceal each fraudulent claim check, the processor prepared and sent a data
entry code sheet to data processing, which recorded the issued check in the dis
bursement and statistical claim information files. The processor then destroyed
copies of the coding sheets which should have gone into the claim files. The
fraud was detected when the processor coded a sheet incorrectly causing a mis
match between the disbursement file and a cancelled check. The fraud lasted
sixteen months and exceeded $110,000.
31. In a five-year period, a claim supervisor converted about $500,000 by
submitting false health claims that generated checks payable to special payees
or outside accomplices covered by group health contracts. The supervisor’s po
sition provided access to other people’s passwords and negated some of the seg
regation of duties controls passwords create. In some cases, the supervisor gave
fraudulent claim papers to clerks to process in the course of their work and later
destroyed the papers. In other cases, the supervisor used a terminal to add
names to the eligibility file and then entered fraudulent claim data. Detection
occurred when the perpetrator of another fraud told an internal auditor that this
might be going on.
32. A group pension supervisor had complete control over payment transac
tions and related correspondence with contract holders and claimants. The su
pervisor initiated fraudulent lump-sum payment requests for eighteen months.
The computer control to detect duplicate payments was based on a comparison
of social security numbers, which the supervisor circumvented by transposing
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the social security numbers of the fraudulent payments. The fraud, which ex
ceeded $400,000, was revealed when a legitimate retiree requested a lump-sum
benefit and a clerk remembered seeing a previous claim payment to the retiree.
33. A policy service supervisor submitted file maintenance transactions to
change the name and address fields on valid master policy record files to those
of family members. The supervisor then prepared coded input documents to
authorize fictitious premium refunds amounting to over $14,000. Once the
computer-generated refunds were made, the perpetrator restored the correct
data on the changed policy records. The fraud, which lasted four months, was
detected in the bank reconciliation process when a clerk, instructed to review
checks for unusual items, noticed a series of large amounts to the same payees
and addresses.
34. A producer, working with a policy service clerk as an accomplice, cre
ated bogus policies and manipulated valid ones to obtain loans and the full an
nualized commissions when only one monthly premium was paid. The perpe
trators used error correction routines to prevent recovery of the annualized
commissions when the bogus policies were cancelled. In addition, fictitious
premium “ paid-to” date entries were made to increase case equities. The per
petrators then submitted policy loan requests for the increased cash equity and
negotiated checks that were made payable to the insured. The schemes lasted
five years and netted $300,000. Detection occurred when the producer com
plained about a commission payment, which aroused a supervisor’s suspicion.
35. A policy service supervisor responsible for the dividend unit created
fictitious dividend payments by submitting requests with bogus policy num
bers; the checks were mailed to an outside accomplice. When the check was
authorized by the supervisor, the check data automatically created the account
ing entry and simultaneously updated the master policy file. Because a bogus
number was involved, an update of the policy file would reject and the transac
tion would appear on an error report that was returned to the supervisor for in
vestigation. Apparently, these listings were subsequently destroyed by this in
dividual. The scheme was discovered accidentally during a routine review of
dividend transactions at the corporate office. It lasted thirty months and netted
$150,000.
36. A policy service clerk introduced file maintenance transactions to can
cel active policies, which produced policyholder cancellation notices and pre
mium refund checks. The clerk destroyed the cancellation notices and forged
the refund checks. The clerk then followed a special error correction procedure
to reinstate the policies with full coverage. This scheme was detected through a
non-routine study of paid checks in which an employee noticed many out-ofstate policyholders had apparently cashed their checks locally. The scheme
lasted one year and netted $25,000.
37. A policy change clerk with access to an on-line terminal entered name
and address changes to alter the policy master file records to the clerk’s spouse.
Using general ledger transactions, the clerk caused refund checks to be mailed
to the spouse. The refund accounting entry was entered into a general ledger
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suspense account not adequately controlled at the time. Detection was made
when a supervisor routinely reviewed the suspense account for old items. The
scheme netted $5,000 in four months.
38. A group dental claim processor obtained the names of covered employ
ees from a co-conspirator employee of a policyholder company. Using a termi
nal, the clerk entered fictitious claims made payable to the covered employees,
but mailed to a post office box. The checks were obtained, signatures forged,
and proceeds ($30,000 in twenty-one months) split. The fraud was detected
when the claim clerk was absent and a replacement clerk routinely called a den
tist for verification of the nature of a claim.
39. Three claim processors, using terminals, entered fictitious claim data
causing computer-produced checks to be sent to each other’s home addresses.
The supervisor had lunch with one of the perpetrators who mentioned that one
of the other perpetrators, now an ex-employee, was being investigated for den
tal claim frauds by the new employer. The supervisor initiated an audit of the
claims processed by the informer and the ex-employee; the audit eventually dis
closed the three perpetrators. This scheme lasted for sixteen months and netted
$80,000.
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